

July 20, 1967

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

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Under the guidance of the Director of Continuing Education in the field of nursing at the University of Pittsburgh, we have been broadcasting a one-hour program for the last two years. This program is geared to the professional nurse employed by the general hospital. Its main objective is to provide more information on mental health concepts, such as caring for problem patients. Our survey shows we are reaching 40 to 60 hospitals and 500 to 800 professional people.

We have not even really begun to explore the potential of this tool and the ways to harness its power. All of our work to date has been trial and error. We work constantly without sufficient funds, qualified staff and facilities to carry out such a program.

With a well developed concept, this could reach even the smallest of communities. The further you go from a metropolitan area, the more such a service is needed.

No one station, at the present time, is in a position to do little more than to meet its every day operations, its budget and its problems.

I feel that a national group, maybe the Public Television Corporation, is needed to set up the criteria, studies, research, the mechanism to bring the resources that are needed to make educational television a true and integral part of the Adult Education Program.

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## American Policy in the Middle East

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 20, 1967

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, Dr. Marver Bernstein, the dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs of Princeton University delivered a perceptive address to the recent National Emergency Conference on Israel, sponsored by the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations.

I urge my colleagues to read his analysis of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

The text follows:

## AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

(By Marver H. Bernstein)

Without a major change, American policy in the Middle East will fail—as it failed to prevent the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.

A brief perspective of what American policy has been in the past may offer some guidance in the mammoth task of achieving a basic shift in that policy.

The overriding goal of American policy had been to maintain a prudent security equilibrium in the Middle East and to promote internal stability in the region.

These terms are very imprecise. They confer maximum discretion on the President and the State Department, not only because the Executive Branch must struggle to maintain its initiative *vis-a-vis* Congress, but also because the fluidity of the Middle Eastern situation requires it. The American interest lies not in instability but in peace. The critical issue, of course, is stability for *what* and *on whose terms*.

How was the goal of a prudent security equilibrium to be reached or promoted? Essentially, four approaches were utilized:

The *first* was guarantees of the independence and territorial integrity of Israel.

The *second* included a pattern of actions and policies designed to minimize Soviet and Chinese penetration of the Middle East.

The *third* was the use of foreign aid as a tool for maintaining equilibrium, reducing Soviet penetration and promoting economic growth.

The *fourth* was the maintenance of open channels of communication with Arab governments to enable the United States to exercise some influence over their behavior and beliefs. In this connection any overt alliance of the United States with Israel would have appeared to polarize the Middle East and send the Arab states rushing off to Moscow.

What have been the main characteristics of American policy in the Middle East? Here, in outline, are some nine features of that policy:

1. In the effort to maintain an equilibrium in the Middle East which is at least neutral with respect to the United States-Soviet conflict, the American position often seemed very kind to the Arabs and very harsh toward Israel. Why was this the case? Part of the answer lay in recognizing that Israel is pro-United States and Nasser is usually anti-U.S. It seems striking and ironic, therefore, that the United States should have rewarded its enemies more than its friends. In any case, as columnist William S. White wrote, "Any notion that our foreign policy in the Middle East is run with special tenderness for Jewish feelings is one of the special idiocies of our time." [The Washington Post, Jan. 29, 1965]

Be that as it may, the main drift of the policy of three Administrations had been one of exceptional kindness to Nasser's Egypt, not primarily because the United States strongly preferred Egypt to Israel, but because United States conception of the problems of achieving a security balance in the Middle East required it.

2. On February 1, 1965, Under Secretary of State George Ball told the Senate Appropriations Committee: "What happens in the Near East is of critical importance to our strategic sea, air and land routes, to our vast oil investment; to the security of Israel and other countries in that area." The United States position reflected a tendency—shared with other Western countries—to overrate the political, military and economic importance of the Middle East.

To be sure, the Middle East is the link connecting three continents; it is the intersecting point of land, water and air routes; it does contain the major oil reserves of the world. But these have all become less rather than more strategic on the contemporary scene. The demand for oil has increased greatly in recent years, but so have resources outside of the Middle East increased greatly—in North Africa, in Iran, in South America, in Canada and elsewhere; and natural gas discoveries have also helped to supply the growing needs of European industry. While nuclear energy is some distance off, and the demand for oil will increase in the years ahead, we seem to give more attention to protecting American oil investments in the Middle East than considerations of military strategy require.

3. A pedestrian and obvious fact of contemporary Middle Eastern history is the persistent inability of Arabs to unite politically despite the strong belief that unity is their natural condition. But there is a conception that is not so obvious; the persistent notion that Arab unity would be in the interests of the United States and its allies, and also the interests of Israel as well as the Arab countries, despite the fact that a unified Arab world would seem more likely to be anti-U.S. than either neutral or pro-U.S.

The dominant theme of Nasser, as the top leader of Arab nationalism, has been Arab unit. Unity has been held forth as the ineluctable destiny of the Arab world. But clearly, Arab unity has been the exception, not the rule, in Arab history. The factors that divide and distinguish the Arab countries appear to be far more substantial than

the one factor that unites them—hatred of Israel. As Abba Eban recently wrote, nothing has divided the Arab world more than the effort to unite it.

The U.S. position had maintained that a prudent security equilibrium in the Middle East was more likely to be achieved under conditions of Arab unity than Arab diversity and political pluralism. The case usually rested on the view that economic growth would be fostered by unity and would itself create pride in economic achievement and thereby minimize or reduce anti-Israel slogans as the goal of unity.

However, a strong case could have been made that a pluralistic diverse Arab world of separate governments could more easily accommodate an Israel-Arab understanding. A Middle East convulsed by an Egyptian bid for centralized control scarcely seemed a congenial setting for achieving such understanding.

4. The U.S. experience in the Middle East postdated the full-blown emergence of the Palestine issue. The United States, compared with England and France, has had only minimal experience in dealing with Middle Eastern problems. Perhaps because of its lack of regional experience, the U.S. has been tempted to be overly impressed with psychological and sociological factors in the Arab picture; for example, the trauma and bitter frustration of the Arabs resulting from their humiliating defeat by the Israelis; the dream-like quality of their hopes and fears; their enormous pride and sense of personal dignity; and the great gulf between their verbal ferocity and their timid deeds.

Awareness of these factors may help to account for the tendency of the experts to have discounted the militancy reflected by the violent statements of Arab leaders. Among knowledgeable experts there was often a characteristic paradox in value judgment; an admiring attitude regarding Arab culture and historical development and sympathy for strivings for personal dignity; and at the same time bitter disappointment with the lack of Arab achievement and fulfillment.

Caught in this value paradox, the experts in the State Department often seemed to interpret Nasser's violent aims as merely hortatory—not really to be taken seriously. We were often not quite such what Nasser really meant; hence, his words were rarely taken to mean what they plainly said. Israel is scarcely to be criticized if it took the view that it could not discount the plain meaning of the words as completely as the diplomats appeared to do.

5. Clearly, the American experts in international affairs tended to believe that Israel had exaggerated in assessing the immediacy of the threats to its existence. Why? Part of the answer lay in the respect for Israel's effectiveness as an independent nation coupled with a lack of confidence in the capacity and human resources of Arab countries.

Perhaps another part of the answer is that the United States has been more acutely aware than many Israelis of the unsettling effects of Israel's policy regarding retaliatory or preemptive raids and attacks. The United States believed that Israel exaggerated threats to its existence and was therefore too quick in embarking on retaliatory raids. The American view had been that Israel was insufficiently aware of the consequences, adverse to the interests of Israel and the West, flowing from its militancy. World opinion often perceived the killings but not the provocation, and the U.N. machinery had not proved to be helpful to Israel in evaluating Arab complaints and charges.

6. There was a tendency to exaggerate the consequences of Nasser's strong and spirited drive for modernization and industrialization. The fact is that time had been running out for Nasser. Military expenditures had become almost insupportable. The Yemeni campaign had been a dismal failure and ex-

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tremendously costly. The population explosion had run ahead of the pace of economic growth. The level of economic activity had increased in absolute amounts but had declined on a per capita basis. In this context the inner logic of Nasser's position seemed to move toward war of military expansion.

7. Nasser proved to be a very formidable opponent in dealing with the United States. He has been a first-rate bargainer and bluffer. He effectively manipulated the U.S. and Soviet Union in order to obtain maximum financial and military aid for Egypt. He knew that he had advantages in bargaining only in the context of crises, which he has been very adept at manufacturing.

Nasser succeeded in using the cold war to internationalize Arab affairs. He thereby gained a lever to exact better terms from both the West and the East. The American goal of Arab unity in turn played into the hands of Nasser whose policy could succeed only by making Arab unity a leading international issue. Nasser effectively demonstrated Egypt's nuisance value by showing that he was dangerous and had to be bought off at a high price.

There are some elements of high tragedy here. Nasser has been personally incorrupt, a highly effective ruler who led Egypt through a major social revolution. He developed new industries, exterminated the great landowners, bolstered the educational system and nurtured a new middle class of military officers, young professionals and bureaucrats.

On the other hand, labor productivity in Egypt stayed very low, consumption pitifully low. Poverty remained intense. Egypt was not slowly catching up with a Western standard, but rather was steadily falling behind. The country lived on borrowed money and neither capitalism nor Communism seemed to work. It was critically important that Nasser keep up the morale and perquisites of the new middle class, but he was unable to do so in the context of economic retrenchment.

The economists advised Nasser that such retrenchment was mandatory for economic survival. But as a military leader of high ambition with a mission to fulfill, he may have thought that his only way out was through continued expansion in Israel or elsewhere.

8. The case for financial aid to Egypt and other Arab countries could well have been justified by general humanitarian considerations; otherwise it was rather weak.

The basic postulate of foreign aid is that Western security is promoted best by helping countries maintain independence and becoming viable economically; and if the West does not help, the East will. The United States also appeared to believe, with some justification, that however hostile Nasser may be to the West, anyone replacing him would probably be worse.

Yet, had Nasser received no aid whatsoever from the West, it is difficult to imagine that he could have been more hostile.

9. In 1964 and 1965, in contrast to the French and West German attitudes and policies toward Israel, a noticeable wavering and weakness as well as some clumsiness showed up in London and Washington in their dealings with the excesses of the Egyptians and the Syrians.

Certainly, American reaction had been very cautious when American libraries went up in flames. U.S. diplomats appeared to have considered German recognition of Israel in 1964 as a matter of doubtful wisdom. They also urged Israel not to resort to arms in meeting the attacks of the Palestine Liberation Army, and not to resist Arab water diversion projects. The State Department seemed to take the view that it would be a long time before a determination could be made as to whether the Arabs would really be violating the Johnston Water Plan.

The Israelis had a valid claim in believing that the United States preferred to avoid strong clear action strengthening Israel's security, and at the same time be willing, however reluctantly, to tolerate intolerable effrontery and vilification on the part of Arab leaders. It was to be expected that Israel would often be disappointed with the attitude of American officials toward its security needs. In the minds of American officials Israel's needs always had to be measured against the probable reaction of Arab leaders.

It was a dominant consideration in the Eisenhower-Dulles policy that the Arabs were more fearful of Zionism than of Communism. Dulles believed that the United States had to counter the Arab belief that the United States supported aggressive expansion of Israel. Recognition of this belief and fear inhibited American action and policy in Israel. At the same time the United States was ready to use economic aid to influence the government of Israel. Thus, it delayed for a long time the move of Israel's Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem; it stopped hydro-electric development on the Jordan River; and its reactions to the Quibya Raid of October 1953 did deter subsequent militancy on the part of Israel.

Given the deep complexity of Middle Eastern issues, it has been difficult for American Jews to understand U.S. policy. I do not mean approval, but understanding. The main difficulty has been the failure to understand that the American attempt to achieve a prudent security balance in the Middle East prevented the United States from meeting Israel's security needs as Israel defined them. Israelis tended to understand better than American Jews did why it was inevitable that the American response to Israel's stated security needs fell short of Israel's demands.

This brings us to the present crisis. How did American policy of friendly detachment and concerned neutrality express itself just before and during the outbreak of war? The record shows the following:

The United States would not permit the annihilation of Israel. But short of that decisive threat, it undertook no initiative unilaterally.

The United States did not expect war between the Arabs and Israel and thought that the Israelis had exaggerated Nasser's threats of extermination.

The United States did not expect the United Nations to arrange an accommodation, but it nevertheless turned to the U.N. to avoid diplomatic isolation.

It became uncertain in the weekend in early June before war broke out whether the United States could hold Israel in check without making some strategic commitment to Israel.

The United States actively explored various proposals to reopen the Gulf of Aqaba through some face-saving compromise that would recognize Egypt's sovereignty over the Strait of Tiran, yet assure Israel's access to the sea. It also considered Thant's proposal to place U.N. truce observers on both sides of the Arab-Israel frontier.

The United States became increasingly perturbed by the emergence of the Soviet Union as the champion of the Arabs, by its historic expansionist drive toward the Mediterranean, and by its attempt to control half or more of Europe's oil imports.

Repeated guarantees of Israel's security failed to prevent the present hostilities, and Israel consequently saw a better chance to resolve the issue of national survival through war rather than diplomacy. Events would seem to support Israel's strategic judgment.

What lesson is to be learned from this review of the American posture of concerned neutrality and friendly detachment in the Middle East?

It can be stated simply that the traditionally ambivalent U.S. policy failed.

Therefore, the President, the State Department and the Congress must be advised and persuaded to use the opportunities provided by Israel's military victory to achieve a massive reduction of the tensions that underlie the war.

*It means a recognition of the illusory character of Arab unity and the political unreliability of Arab leadership.*

*It means a lifting of both the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal.*

*It means, above all, a peace treaty between Israel and each of the Arab states that recognizes the legitimacy of Israeli statehood.*

*It means a readjustment of boundaries to meet Israel's urgent security needs, including the Gaza Strip, the area around Latrun and the hills directly to the north and west of Jerusalem, and the Old City of Jerusalem itself, with appropriate guarantees for the safety of Christian and Moslem holy places.*

These objectives will not be achieved if the United States conforms to its traditional policy of concerned neutrality. Effective movement toward achieving Israel's legitimate goals calls for a substantial shift in American policy.

The obstacles to such a marked change in policy are indeed great. They include:

American preoccupation with Viet Nam.

The horrible complexities and confusions of foreign policy-making in the United States.

Traditional Foreign Service sympathy for Arab interests.

The heightened enmity of the Arab countries for Israel.

The considerable Afro-Asian support of the U.A.R.

The unfriendliness of the U.N. arena for the resolution of issues directly involving Israel.

But there are also some factors influencing the kind of policy change that circumstances now require. One is the emergence of new leadership in Israel composed of men who have been taught to rely not on international guarantees but rather upon their own courage, initiative and resourcefulness. Another is the strong moral, political and financial support of American citizens for the continued independence and security of Israel free from the dangerous challenges that have persisted for nineteen years of statehood.

## Out With Tradition

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

HON. EDWARD R. ROYBAL

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 20, 1967

Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call your attention to an article from the July issue of California Librarian that deals with a new concept in libraries that the Los Angeles Public Library is currently trying. With the help of the Federal Library Services and Construction Act, this project attempts to improve library service and contact in the culturally deprived areas of Los Angeles by the use of supplemental specialized librarians who try to awaken the reading interests of the children and their parents by such unorthodox methods as Classic Comics books and library-centered informal community programs. In addition, bookmobiles and elementary school library classes help to encourage

fense of the rights of men, irrespective of race, religious convictions and sex. This is the time to give help, not in words, but in deeds...

"Regarding the necessity of concerning ourselves with the situation of the Jewish population, which is without shelter . . . the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to draw the attention of the General Assembly to the following circumstances: The experience of the past . . . has shown that not one State of Western Europe has been in a position to give proper help to the Jewish people and to defend its interests, or even its existence, against the violence that was directed against it from the Hitlerites and its allies. This is a very serious fact, but unfortunately, like all facts, it must be recognized.

"The fact that not a single Western European State has been in a position to guarantee the defense of the elementary rights of the Jewish people or compensate them for the violence they have suffered at the hands of the Fascist hangmen explains the aspiration of the Jews for the creation of a State of their own. It would be unjust not to take this into account and to deny the right of the Jewish people in the realization of such an aspiration. It is impossible to justify a denial of this right of the Jewish people."

Although Mr. Gromyko had proposed the creation of one dual, democratic Arab-Jewish State, he did note in his speech that "if it were found that this plan was unrealizable on account of the deterioration of relations between Jews and Arabs . . . then," he added, "it would be necessary to consider an alternative solution," namely the creation of "two independent separate states—one Jewish, and one Arab."

The historic Partition decision was voted upon on November 29, 1947. The Soviets know full well that the Arabs rejected the decision; that they went to war on May 14, 1948, and have remained belligerent ever since.

### Flag Revives Thoughts of Our Nation's History

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. THADDEUS J. DULSKI**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 20, 1967

Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Speaker, just recently our country celebrated another anniversary of its independence. To many Americans, this was a day on which to fly our flag; to some Americans, every day is a day to fly the flag.

They fly the flag because they are proud of our Nation. I wish I could say that more Americans unashamedly were as proud.

America has not been without error, and loyal citizens today are questioning whether she is not making some errors now.

Based on our firm belief in "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" for all mankind, we can be justifiably proud of our country's motives and ideals. Is there another nation in the world that has sacrificed so much in two world wars, in Korea, and presently in Vietnam, for the cause of freedom? Is there another country in the world that has given so generously to help underdeveloped nations and starving peoples?

For such a nation we should be grateful, and thankful. We can be proud of her. We should fly the flag every day to show that we are.

With permission, I include the following article which appeared in Everybody's Column of the Buffalo Evening News, Buffalo, N.Y., on May 27, 1967:

#### FLAG REVIVES THOUGHTS OF OUR NATION'S HISTORY

To those who would burn our flag I ask, what do you see when you see our flag?

I see Bunker Hill and Valley Forge. I see Gettysburg, and Antietam, Argonne Forest and Flanders Field, Iwo Jima and the Coral Sea. I see Korea and Porkchop Hill, Vietnam and fresh blood being spilled for freedom's sake.

I see the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Washington and Lincoln Memorials. I see mighty mountains and great plains, great rivers and lakes. I see great railroads, air-lines and networks of roads uniting us into a great nation.

I see great cities with buildings touching the sky. I see our young astronauts flying into outer space.

How anyone can see all this and still burn our flag and draft cards is beyond me. They certainly don't belong in America.

Freedom isn't something handed out on a platter. It is something fought and died for. Without the sacrifices of millions before us, there just wouldn't be a United States.

The next time you see our flag go by, stand up tall and straight and, if a tear comes to your eye, don't be ashamed, for then you are an American.

AN AMERICAN.

### The Los Angeles Job Corps Center for Women

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. AUGUSTUS F. HAWKINS**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 20, 1967

Mr. HAWKINS. Mr. Speaker, the Los Angeles Times recently featured a story about the success of the Los Angeles Job Corps Center for Women which I know my colleagues will find useful and informative.

Job Corps, as one of the Office of Economic Opportunity programs, is demonstrating daily its success in developing one of America's greatest natural resources: our young men and women.

As the Times article points out, more than 800 young women have gone through the 1-year program at the Los Angeles center. Seventy-five percent of these young ladies are now gainfully employed as a result of their Job Corps training and experience.

When we realize that the Job Corps enrollees are from the lowest income areas of our Nation, I think we can take considerable pride in the progress and low rate of dropouts that occurs in the Job Corps training programs. Only 3 percent of the girls drop out of the Los Angeles women's center program.

I am particularly pleased to include the complete article from the July 3 Los Angeles Times, written by Mr. Bob Rawitch, which so thoroughly demonstrates the success and progress the Job

Corps is bringing in the OEO struggle against poverty:

#### FEW DROPOUTS HERE: WOMEN'S JOB CORPS SUCCEEDS

(By Bob Rawitch)

Entering its third year of operation, the Los Angeles Job Corps Center for Women is one of the most successful of the 115 training centers in the United States.

Recent Job Corps statistics show that nationally 53% of the graduates for a six-month period in 1966-67 were employed. In the past two years the Los Angeles center shows 75% of its graduates presently employed.

Also, while the national dropout rate is approximately 11%, the local center has only 3% of its girls leave the program.

Miss Mary Doolittle, director of the center here, reports that more than 300 women have graduated from the program since it opened its door in June 1965.

#### MOST ARE DROPOUTS

The Job Corps is a residential training program for young men and women between the ages of 16 and 21. Most of the participants are school dropouts without sufficient employable skills to sell in the labor market.

Founded by the federal Office of Economic Opportunities, the center, 1107 S. Broadway, houses 320 women.

The director attributes the low dropout rate to "having a social climate which is a 'therapeutic community'."

"We try to adapt the center's program to the needs of the individual girl rather than make her conform to a set program," she said.

Professional counselors and resident advisers are assigned to each residential floor to provide guidance and counseling to the girls 24 hours a day.

The successful job placement record of the center here can be attributed to a "fine staff and being located in a large city with a greater variety of vocational training opportunities," Miss Doolittle says.

Approximately 70% of the women are trained in the center, 20% are in on-the-job training with local businesses and other groups and 10% are in the city's trade and technical schools.

Of the girls who have taken training in an outside business, 90% are hired permanently by that firm once they have completed their training, she said.

#### TRAINING COST CUT

Nationally the Job Corps has come under heavy criticism at times for discipline problems. However, no apparent problem exists locally, according to Miss Doolittle.

"We really have no more problems than any high school or college sorority and, because there is such close supervision, we probably have fewer disciplinary problems," she said.

During the two years of operation only seven girls have been arrested and only four were convicted. More than 800 girls have gone through the program.

"We have never had a problem with narcotics and have never had any physical fights," she said.

The cost of training a woman has been reduced from \$9,000 per year at the inception of the program to approximately \$5,000—one of the lowest figures in the country, according to the director.

A recent 30% reduction in federal funds is partly responsible, she said, but she attributes a great deal of the savings to "long hours by the staff, attaining a degree of expertise in administration, and the volunteer help of several hundred Los Angeles residents who aid in tutoring."

Numerous "firsts" have also been accomplished by the local center including placing the first corpswomen as airline stewardesses, lady barbers, fashion designers and radio-TV servicewomen.

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**An Educator's Viewpoint on the Middle East Situation****EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF****HON. GUY VANDER JAGT**

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 20, 1967

MR. VANDER JAGT. Mr. Speaker, because of the extreme seriousness of the Middle East situation, it is important that every opportunity be taken to become, whenever possible, informed on news and different viewpoints related to it.

A constituent of mine, a high school principal from Baldwin, Mich., offers several thoughts in a recent letter to me. I believe my colleagues will find the letter which follows of significant interest:

BEIRUT, LEBANON,

July 3, 1967.

Congressman GUY VANDER JAGT,  
U.S. Congress,  
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

DEAR GUY: My family and I are spending a few weeks in the Middle East before returning home and going to Guam for two years. War broke out here while we were on our way. We met hundreds of refugees in Europe being evacuated from all of the countries in the Middle East. We took the opportunity to talk with these people as well as to Jewish people returning to Israel and Arabs returning to their homes in the various Middle Eastern countries.

We arrived in Beirut, Lebanon, one day before the fighting stopped, the day of the demonstrations against the United States and Great Britain. We were the only Americans going to the Middle East. Beirut was and still is under Marshal Law. The local people are all amazed to see Americans here, but everyone is very polite and helpful. They ask us to tell other Americans that it is safe to return to Lebanon. As you know Guy, I have always been interested in International Affairs and, in the Middle East in particular. I was in the Middle East in 1960-1961 as a Post Graduate student at the American University of Beirut. At that time I traveled throughout the Middle Eastern countries and made many friends.

I am sure you will remember I expressed my deep concern about the direction events are drifting in the Middle East when I talked to you last, in Baldwin on May 30th. Some times we, students of history who maintain that interest in our daily lives, see events in a different light than do these whose training and interest are in another field.

Unfortunately people in United States do not understand the significance, the tremendous significance to us and to our country of the present historical events here in the Middle East. It is impossible to understand the significance of present events except through an historical understanding of the Middle East, the Jewish Religion, the Moslem Religion, the Christian Religion, a history of the various countries, their people and culture and very important at this time, an understanding of the Russian action and aspiration in this area. Recently I wrote an historical article explaining Russian action in the Middle East. I sent the article from here, Beirut, Lebanon, to the Grand Rapid Press. If it was published perhaps you could read it.

Let me say this much concerning Russian actions in the Middle East. By giving the

Arab Nations obsolete armaments they have accomplished several things. (1) They obtained high grade cotton and other quality merchandise in return, (2) they have made heroes of themselves among the masses, (3) they have made villains of the United States, (4) they have further weakened the Arab Nations, prevented a strong local leader from dominating the Arab people in the Middle East and increased their influence and the dependency of the Arabs on Russia.

It is so easy to gain the wrong impression about Russian armaments in the Middle East. We always hear about the SAM anti-aircraft missiles, latest model tanks, and the MIG 21 and later model SU-7 Jets. These are the weapons we are interested in, the weapons Egypt and other countries like to display and brag about. We don't realize those weapons are too few to be effective, that most of the armaments are out dated WW II tanks and obsolete Mig-17's and Mig-19's. With a few exceptions the local citizens in the various Arab countries are unaware of this themselves. They think Russia is giving their leaders the best and latest armaments.

Why can Russia gain so much from a financially sound business deal when we get kicked in the teeth every time we hand out a free dollar? Most Americans think the Russians backed a losing side in the Middle East, that Russia then cooperated with United States in helping to end the war. The truth is Russia won in the Middle East. It is difficult to see how she could have won more. If Nasser had won he would have become a strong leader in the whole Arab Middle East. Did Russia want that? Unfortunately most Americans think so. If Nasser had won, Russia would have lost. Nasser has jailed local communists in Egypt for years. Russia wants weak, divided nations in the Middle East. She wants to extend her influence in these divided and weak nations. She wants to prevent the emergence of a strong leader who might unite these nations. She wants to discredit the United States in the Middle East. Russia accomplished all of these goals. The Arabs lost the war in the Middle East. United States lost a great deal of influence as well as bases in the Middle East, but Russia, Russia was the big winner. She won far more than did tiny, victorious Israel.

Russia is playing for high stakes; bases in the Mediterranean. When Russia obtains bases at Latakia, Syria, Algeria, Egypt and on the Red Sea our Government may wake up. Russia did not lose in this recent war. Russia is not cooperating with the United States, except at our expense. Russia has been trying to obtain bases in the Mediterranean and in the Red Sea for hundreds of years. Russia is so close to this ancient goal now. As usual our government will realize this too late.

Here is the situation that is developing in the Middle East now. Russia is so close to her age old goal of warm water outlets in the South, that she can smell the salt water all the way to Moscow. The United States can not afford to allow Russia to obtain these bases. This is a real keg of dynamite and we don't control the keg. Even Russians do not control this keg of dynamite. It is in the hands of the most highly emotional people in the World. The Jews and the Arabs. Russia realizes this, but the stakes are high. The United States doesn't even know what is going on. Something must be done or this keg of dynamite will explode. If it does it may well set off hydrogen bombs in the United States and all over the World. The fuse to this keg of dynamite is Jerusalem and it was recently lit by Israel. The keg must be defused. If it is not, God help us.

Sincerely,

DON SPOHN.

**Gary Job Corps Center Succeeding in Poverty War Role****EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF****HON. J. J. PICKLE**

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 20, 1967

MR. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues three articles that appeared in the Showcase section last weekend of the Dallas, Tex., Morning News.

The first of the three articles, all of which were written by the News' Austin bureau correspondent, Stewart Davis, is particularly interesting because it shows that the Gary Job Corps Center's role in the war on poverty is a successful venture in getting young men off the streets, trained, and into jobs paying living wages.

It also provides a realistic, firsthand report on the current activities at Gary and academic capabilities of the center.

It is particularly pleasing to note that center's director, Wallace Dockall, says that the operating costs have been cut during the last year while accumulating a record of accomplishments.

The second article is interesting from the point of view the center has been playing in formulating innovations in public school education.

This residual effect, I believe, will be most helpful in keeping to a minimum the number of youngsters who will be forced to drop from school and seek the help of the Job Corps to become productive members of our society.

And finally, I believe there is no more impressive aspect of the center's work than that reported in the final article. It is doubly impressive to know of the confidence and jobs being acquired by the Corpsmen when you realize that most Corpsmen comprise the "dregs" of America's classrooms and were the students who sat in the back of their classrooms—if they were in school at all.

Under unanimous consent I include all these excellent stories in the RECORD, and I hope that all those who are sincerely interested in learning of the effectiveness of the Job Corps will give them their careful attention.

The articles follow:

CENTER CUTS COSTS: GARY CORPSMEN SUCCEED

(By Stewart Davis)

SAN MARCOS, TEX.—The Gary Job Corps Center here has cut operating costs during the last year, while accumulating a record of accomplishments.

The average annual cost per trainee has dropped from \$5,200 to about \$4,000, said Wallace Dockall, director of the center.

Dockall attributed the decrease to a general tightening of administration and economy-minded purchases.

He said that heavy earth-moving equipment, for example, was purchased as military surplus at a savings of about \$1.5 million. The equipment is used in an instructional program.

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The following list gives the area and population of the nations that were part of the British Empire on December 31, 1945, but are now independent and maintain membership in the commonwealth of nations. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand are also members of the commonwealth, but they are not included below as they were independent in 1945 except for their loyalty to the king.

Nation	Square miles	Present population
Barbados	166	245,000
Ceylon	25,332	11,232,000
Cyprus	3,572	598,000
Gambia	4,361	338,000
Ghana	92,100	7,740,000
Guyana	83,000	647,000
India	1,261,813	499,000,000
Jamaica	4,232	1,827,000
Kenya	224,960	9,643,000
Malaysia	127,672	9,395,000
Malta	122	317,000
Nigeria	356,669	57,500,000
Pakistan	365,529	104,138,000
Sierra Leone	27,925	2,290,000
Singapore	225	1,891,000
Tanzania	362,844	10,513,000
Trinidad and Tobago	1,980	975,000
Zambia	290,587	3,780,000
Total	3,233,089	722,071,000

The following table gives the area and population of the nations that were part of the French empire in 1945 but are now independent of France:

Nation	Square miles	Present population
Algeria	919,591	11,290,000
Cameroon	183,591	5,210,000
Dahomey	43,483	2,244,000
Guinea	94,925	3,500,000
Ivory Coast	123,483	3,500,000
Laos	91,428	3,000,000
Mauritania	397,683	1,000,000
Niger	459,073	3,433,000
Togo	21,853	1,659,000
Total	2,335,110	34,836,000

The following list gives the area and population of the nations that were part of the French Empire in 1945 but are now independent and maintain membership in the French community:

Nation	Square miles	Present population
Central African Republic	240,540	2,088,000
Chad	490,733	3,254,000
Congo	134,749	840,000
Gabon	102,317	470,000
Malagasy Republic	226,657	6,336,000
Senegal	76,124	3,490,000
Total	1,271,120	16,478,000

The following list gives the area and population of the nations that were part of the Belgian empire in 1945 but are now independent:

Nation	Square miles	Present population
Burundi	10,707	2,800,000
Congo	905,063	15,986,000
Rwanda	10,169	3,073,000
Total	925,939	21,859,000

An area that was part of the Dutch empire in 1945 is now independent:

Indonesia: Square miles, 735,268; present population, 108,000,000.

The nations that have become completely independent of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands control areas totaling 6,239,973 square miles and have a total population of 234,719,000. It is true that Great Britain does not recognize the independence of Rhodesia; however, it is, for the time being at least, a fait accompli.

An additional 4,504,209 square miles are included in the countries that maintain membership in the Commonwealth or are part of the French community after having been colonies of Great Britain and France.

Altogether, almost a billion people live in the many nations that have severed the political ties that previously bound them to several colonial powers.

While Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands have granted independence to most of the peoples over whom they formerly ruled, another empire refuses to relinquish its control over vast areas and many millions of people. What makes this especially reprehensible is that the ruling powers of that empire have been among the most vociferous critics of the other colonial powers.

While the Communists took over a huge area when they seized power in Russia in 1917, they soon added to their already vast territory by annexing such free nations as Armenia, Byelorussia, and Ukraine. In 1940 they added the independent Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to the Soviet empire. These six subjugated nations alone contain 391,787 square miles, with a total population of 62,230,000. Millions of other people who live in the Soviet empire are just as anxious to be free from Communist tyranny as the people who lived in Russia before 1917 yearned to be free from the tyranny of the czars.

The following table gives the area and population of the free nations that were taken over by the Soviet empire after the Communists came to power:

Nation	Square miles	Present population
Armenia	11,306	2,134,000
Byelorussia	80,154	8,533,000
Estonia	17,413	1,273,000
Latvia	24,695	2,241,000
Lithuania	26,173	2,949,000
Ukraine	232,046	45,100,000
Total	391,787	62,230,000

Besides the countries that have been incorporated into the Soviet empire, a number of other nations are satellites of Moscow, their rulers being mere puppets whose strings are pulled by their masters in the Kremlin. Several other countries are under the control of Communist China.

The following table gives the area and population of the nations that are satellites of the Soviet empire or Red China:

Nation	Square miles	Present population
Albania	11,100	1,865,000
Bulgaria	42,823	8,227,000
Cuba	44,218	7,833,000
Czechoslovakia	49,371	14,194,000
East Germany	41,816	17,048,000
Hungary	35,919	10,160,000
Mongolia	604,247	1,087,000
North Korea	46,540	12,100,000
North Vietnam	61,293	18,100,000
Poland	120,359	31,619,000
Romania	91,699	19,105,000
Yugoslavia	98,766	19,756,000
Total	1,248,151	161,094,000

Mr. Speaker, whether the representatives of the American people sit in the Congress of the United States or in the highest councils of the executive branch, let them continually demand that the Communist imperialists relinquish their hold on the countries they have taken over and on the satellite nations where their stooges carry out orders from Moscow and Peking. To fail to make such demands unceasingly is to betray the meaning of Captive Nations Week.

*file me*  
Arab Documents Tell of Plan To Murder Israel Civilians

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 20, 1967

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, a recent article appearing in the Jewish Press told of an Arab plan to murder Israel civilians living in designated areas. The fact was disclosed after Israel soldiers captured top-secret Jordanian military orders during the recent war in the Middle East.

I commend to the attention of our colleagues the following article which appeared in the July 14, 1967, edition of the Jewish Press.

The article follows:

## ARAB DOCUMENTS TELL OF PLAN TO MURDER ISRAELI CIVILIANS

In the sweep of Israeli military forces, captured Jordanian military operational orders were found. These orders told a grisly story. The Jordanian troops were to wipe out the civilian inhabitants of the Israeli population centers!

Special battalions were given the assignment to destroy methodically specific villages and all the inhabitants. No woman or child was to be left alive!

The orders were top secret and kept only at the Brigade level until it was decided to activate them. This opportunity never came.

When Israeli troops captured the Jordanian West Bank, orders in identical style were found in the top secret files of all seven brigade headquarters. Had Jordan been victorious it would have meant wholesale slaughter.

Orders discovered at the Ramallah headquarters, north of Jerusalem, assigned the Reserve battalion to destroy Motza, an Israeli

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village of some 800 people. The village is three miles west of Jerusalem on the highway to Tel Aviv.

The captured orders read, "Top Secret: Battalion Headquarters: A. The intention of the headquarters of the Western Front is to carry out an attack on the village of Motza, to destroy it and kill all of its inhabitants.

"B. The Reserve Battalion of the Brigade shall carry out an attack on the Motza village, destroy it and kill its inhabitants on receipt of the code from the Brigade."

The battle plans of the Arab forces was drawn way back in May of 1967. One set of orders captured by the Israeli forces, dated May 18, 1967, tells of the air operations that would have been necessary for the conquest of the Southern Negev and that of cutting off Eilat.

The orders read:

"TOP SECRET

"U.A.R.  
"Eastern Area Command H.Q.  
"Chief of Staff's Bureau  
"No. td/3/1967/124  
"Date: 18 May 1967

"BATTLE ORDER NO. 3/57

"1. An offensive operation is planned for the cutting off of the southern Negev area and to conquer Eilat.

"2. The following air power will be allocated for exploitation by the Ground Forces O. C. for the benefit of the operation.

"a. 27 fighter-bombardment squadron sorties from 2 and 12 Air Brigades stationed at 2 bases, Nos. 248 and 249.

"b. Air forces will bomb Eilat air field, the radio station, and oil storage areas in an effort designated for that purpose by the Air Forces O. C.

"(Signed) LIWA (General) PILOT Abd El Hamid Abd Al Salaam Daghidi, O. C. Eastern Air Command."

In other captured documents, detailed plans for the bombing of civilian areas were enumerated.

Captured Syrian officers admitted that they had been prepared to move into the G'alabina-Durig'at area to prepare attack positions for the full Brigade. The date was set and the war machine in position.

On the morning of May 6, 1967, the 123rd Brigade was to start attacking with two battalions, their objective being to capture Ayelet Hashahar. This attack was to be supported by tanks from the Syrian 44th Brigade Artillery. Simultaneously the Syrian 8th Brigade was to attack Kfar Hanassi.

According to the plan, Syrian forces were to cross the Jordan in rubber boats and establish a bridgehead on the west bank. A bridge which was made ready was to be set up once the bridgehead was established, to enable the passage of tanks.

However, May 6 never did arrive because the Arab groups could not coordinate their plans. At that time U.N. observation teams in the area kept a watchful eye. The attack had to wait until the U. N. troops were pulled out of the area.

The troops left and the plan was readied for enactment, but Israel's swift action in destroying Jordan's military might averted the attack.

Ralph Roberts

SPEECH  
OF

HON. J. EDWARD ROUSH

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 19, 1967

Mr. ROUSH. Mr. Speaker, I would like to echo the sentiments expressed by my colleagues concerning the long and faith-

ful service of the former Clerk of the House, Mr. Ralph Roberts. His tenure of service covered many years and during those years he brought a great measure of honor and integrity not only to himself but to the House of Representatives which he so dearly loved.

Every Member whose service coincided with his has been the recipient of his concern and his help many times. No one is more conscious of this than I. I shall never forget his loyalty, his keen sense of justice, and his willingness to do that which was fair and right. Indiana is proud of this Hoosier who gave so many years of dedicated service to the country. He has our respect and our best wishes for many years of continued good health and happiness.

### Captive Nations Week

#### SPEECH

OF

HON. LUCIEN N. NEDZI

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 19, 1967

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Speaker, one of the basic tenets of American foreign policy is, or should be, to support the just aspirations of people everywhere. Our support cannot and should not always be military. But in every case it should be moral.

This week, Congress observes Captive Nations Week. This observance annually draws the support of scores of Congressmen who together reflect the spectrum of American political thought. Some of these Members do have so-called ethnic blocs in their districts, it is true, but their primary motivation for speaking out is the opportunity to proclaim sympathy, in a meaningful way, with the principle of self-determination.

There has been editorial criticism of Captive Nations Week, with particular emphasis on "pseudo states." Admittedly, as in adversary proceedings in a court of law, you weaken your case when you mix weak arguments with strong arguments, advocates of the week weaken their case when they include as captive nations people who are not and never have been a nation.

But there are real captive nations. I include in that term people with long national histories as well as lingual and cultural identities, who are denied the right to choose their own form of government. Certainly the nations of Eastern Europe fall into this category.

In my judgment, it is properly within the framework of our foreign policy to point out that in country after country in Eastern Europe, non-Communist majorities are subjected to rule by Communist minorities which took power by ugly and conspiratorial means. Recognition of this fact helps us maintain a proper focus as we engage in a policy of "building bridges."

I believe in a policy of "building bridges" as long as we are free of illusions. The encouragement of internal liberalization and external contact among the

Captive Nations seems likely to be more rewarding than a policy of unremitting hostility. Such encouragement, however, should be given with a caveat in mind, and that is the unrepresentative character of the various regimes.

The attitude of the U.S. Government is important. The people of Eastern Europe do look to us. We should not underestimate the vitality of patriotic and nationalistic feeling there. Their fidelity to the Communist cause is thin indeed. It is politically wise and morally correct therefore to "stay the route," to keep informed about Eastern Europe, and to prevail.

In my view, Captive Nations Week is a serious observance and I am pleased to have an opportunity to participate in the reaffirmation by the U.S. Congress of the principle of self-determination.

### U.S. Arms Sales—I

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 20, 1967

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, it is an absurd and futile effect of military diplomacy when both sides of a conflict make war on each other with American weapons. This has happened in Latin American border disputes, in the Indo-Pakistani conflict, and in the Middle East.

Neil Sheehan has begun a series in the New York Times which traces the dealings of the U.S. Government as an arms merchant. It used to be claimed that armaments manufacturers caused wars. Mr. Sheehan shows how the principal arms salesman in the world today is not a private entrepreneur but the U.S. Government.

I am including Mr. Sheehan's first article, from the New York Times of July 19, which I commend to the attention of my colleagues:

[From the New York Times, July 19, 1967]  
A HUGE BUSINESS: ARMAMENT SALES—UNITED STATES IS PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF WEAPONS FOR OTHER LANDS—46-BILLION IN 17 YEARS

(Note.—This is the first of a series of articles on international dealings in arms.)

(By Neil Sheehan)

WASHINGTON, July 18—The five belligerents in the Middle Eastern war—Israel, the United Arab Republic, Syria, Jordan and Iraq—altogether had about 3,300 tanks, more than Hitler employed in the invasion of France in 1940.

Nazi Germany manufactured its own tanks. The Middle Eastern combatants did not. They obtained theirs from the Soviet Union, Britain, France and the United States. Their warplanes, artillery, trucks, signal equipment and the great bulk of their small arms and ammunition were supplied by the same sources.

With these foreign arms, 679 of Egyptians, Jordanians, Syrians and Iraqis were killed. In Sinai, Israel's French-built Mirage and Mysière jets destroyed the Egyptians' Soviet MIG-21 fighters and Ilyushin bombers. On the Jordanian front, both Israelis and Jordanians drove into battle in American-made Patton and Sherman tanks.